For decades, India’s defence debate has been dominated by a familiar contradiction: ambitious military requirements but a slow acquisition system; a large scientific establishment but often inflexible project management; and a growing industrial base but insufficient access to cutting-edge technologies.
But speed in procurement alone will not make India technologically sovereign. That is where the second reform becomes critical. Technology development is inherently iterative: test, fail, redesign, demonstrate, modify and test again. DRDO is awaiting its new full-time leadership through the Prime Minister-led selection process. Its next phase cannot simply be about managing laboratories. It has to be about managing technological missions. The programme for six advanced conventional submarines has been in the pipeline for years. The Finance Ministry has cleared the proposal. P75I is in the final leg, awaiting final approval from the highest authority, where some key aspects must be rechecked. The Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme has moved from concept to industrial execution. The original European FCAS was conceived as a system-of-systems combining a next-generation fighter, unmanned remote carriers and a combat cloud. Joining a future French programme should not mean becoming a junior customer. India’s objective should be co-development, co-design, co-production and co-ownership of technology wherever possible.
Singh’s larger point is therefore important: the reform of acquisition must be about speed. The MoD issued the RFP in May 2026 to shortlisted private-sector contenders for the development of prototypes, with the programme being led by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) under DRDO. AMCA needs 15 GE F414 engines for five flying prototypes. But the programme’s manned-fighter component has run into big industrial and political differences between France and Germany, and Dassault is now pursuing discussions with the French government for a future combat-aircraft demonstrator, potentially flying around 2031-32.
A radar, propulsion system, AI architecture, autonomous platform or electronic-warfare system cannot always be developed according to a rigid linear timetable.
