What the latest development means: Opinion | China’s PLA Is Entering A Dangerous New Phase, And India Can’t

What the latest development means: Opinion | China's PLA Is Entering A Dangerous New Phase, And India Can't

As the final year in the run-up to the PLA’s centenary goals commences, three problems stand out as unresolved. The West’s sustained technology-denial efforts against Beijing, and the curbs placed on its defence state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by a growing roster of American lists, only add to the headwinds. Amid tumultuous times and a looming modernisation deadline, August 1 this year marked 99 years since the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

These are the slow speed of “intelligentisation”, the persistence of “official airs” and military graft, and an inability to prioritise quality over quantity.

Position
Position

Notably, the explainer also flags poor integration of intelligent systems, insufficient algorithm adaptation, and weak combat effectiveness as weaknesses ailing the Chinese military today. So what were the key signals emergent from the varied meetings, commentaries, and lectures that set the stage for the anniversary? The second was combat effectiveness, described, as always, the fundamental standard for testing it. The third was the Integrated National Strategic System and Capabilities theory – which can be understood as a modern successor to ‘Military-Civil Fusion’ – presented as the only route to achieving it. They also confirm that ‘political building’, which loosely means creating a more red, more loyal army, comes ahead of combat preparedness. Warfare, it contends, has entered a stage where algorithms determine victory and detection equals destruction. An illustrative example is the fibre-optic-enabled first-person-view drone, costing a few thousand dollars and capable of destroying armour worth millions. Unmanned and intelligent forces, it insists, must be treated as the main force and protagonist – given a fixed place in organisational structure, used as simulated adversaries in training, and pushed to the last mile in tactics. Hence, a four-level architecture of perception, decision-making, operations and institutional support, with human-machine collaborative decision-making as the endpoint (for now), becomes evident. Views expressed are personal and do not represent those of the Institution)

Together, these point to a framework likely to structure every military work report until the 21st Party Congress in October 2027. To this end, a Xinhua explainer from August 3 argued that whoever builds an intelligent military system first will hold the initiative on the future battlefield. The expectation before August 1 next year is a force cleansed of its diseased trees, leaner and more loyal, under a rebuilt Central Military Commission presented at or before the 21st Party Congress.

The first was the emphasis on political building, framed as the foundation governing the “direction and fundamental character” of modernisation. Finally, in terms of tactical modernisation, the elevation of “intelligentisation” from one leg of that sequence to the decisive one, came along obvious lines. Defence Minister Dong Jun called 2026 a crucial year for winning the battle to achieve the centenary goal, and asked for “shedding feathers and rebirth”. Till such a time as Xi restacks his deck of cards and a new, non-experienced but ever-ready leadership is constituted to take on the task of building a “world-class” fighting force, the window for India’s armed forces to prepare and adapt is more expansive – and yet, shorter than ever before. (Anushka Saxena is Associate Fellow, Geostrategy Programme, The Takshashila Institution.

The candour over quality is more remarkable still. This is the Party conceding, however obliquely, that parts of the past decade’s modernisation and reform budget were wasted, or worse. The era of throwing money at the problem has hence been formally declared over.

A Collective Study Session held by the highest CPC decision-making body, the Politburo, just before the anniversary, highlighted that development without quality is useless, however much of it is done, and that some of it becomes a “burden” and “hindrance” to the armed forces. The correction prescribed is “high efficiency, low cost, and sustainable development”, which fundamentally shifts the focus away from quantitative growth to qualitative improvement.